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This thesis studies the role of the residual value in financial leasing contracts, using the 
real options methodology to provide a valuation of the purchase option embedded in these 
contracts. Using a sample of used cars, I arrive at a cost to lessor between 1% and 12.2% 
of the loan amount for contracts with maturities between one and ten years, conducting 
separate analyses for Diesel and Petrol engines. The sensitivity analyses reveals positive 
impact of interest rate and reference price on the cost to lessor. The alternative of setting 
residual value equal to expected market value is less costly to the lessor but does not 
comply with the purpose of finance leases. 
 
PORTUGUESE 
Esta tese explora o papel do valor residual no contexto dos contratos de locação 
financeira, recorrendo a opções reais para valorizar a opção de compra implícita nestes 
contratos. Usando uma amostra de carros usados, concluí que esta opção pode custar ao 
locatário entre 1% e 12,2% do montante financiado, para maturidades entre um e dez anos 
e análises separadas para motores a Gasóleo e a Gasolina. A análise de sensibilidade conclui 
que a taxa de juro e o preço de referência dos usados têm um impacto positivo no custo 
para o locatário. Definir o valor residual igual ao valor esperado de mercado é menos 
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I: INTRODUCTION  
Leasing is a dedicated financing instrument that allows a user (lessee) to benefit from an 
asset by paying regular rents to its owner (lessor). It is widely used by several companies for 
different assets, including real estate, vehicles, industrial equipment, among others. 
This financing mechanism works as a regular loan, except for the fact that the 
ownership transfer only happens at the end of the contract, and if the lessee desires to do 
so. The purchase option available to the lessees is the subject of this thesis. 
 Lessors are usually financial institutions that want to avoid having the asset returned at 
the end of the lease. They tend to set residual values significantly below the asset’s expected 
market value to encourage the lessee to exercise the option and to keep the debt’s face 
value below asset value. This means that the lessee has a valuable option in hand and the 
lessor might be bearing a significant cost associated with it. 
Focusing on car leases and sample contracts, I estimate the value of this purchase 
option. I conclude that the policy of setting low residual values is costly for lessors, but that 
it is an amount they are willing to leave behind to reduce the chances of having the asset 
returned and keeping the debt under control. 
Finally, I investigate the cost of having a car returned to the lessor and compare the 
above policy to a contract where the residual value equals the expected market value of the 
asset, concluding that it is usually cheaper but not in the interest of neither the lessor nor 
the lessee. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Section II reviews relevant literature. The concepts 
required to understand the topic are detailed in Sections III and IV. Section V explains the 
methodological approach chosen. The results obtained are described and discussed in 
Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn and limitations and further research suggestions 





II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Vancil (1963) raised the question of estimating the residual value under finance leases 
and how it should be included in the lease-or-buy decision. Without the binomial option 
pricing model (1979) nor Black-Scholes (1973), the lessee should compute the cost of a 
lease with terminal purchase option using the residual value as the expected market value of 
the asset (if such amount is a reasonable assumption) and assume that the asset is bought 
and maturity and then depreciated. This cost can then be compared with the purchase 
alternative. 
Later on, Myers & Majd (1983), addressed residual value estimation by establishing the 
parallelism between leasing contracts and American put options, stressing out the value of 
the abandonment option, i.e., the ability to stop using the asset earlier than the predefined 
end of the contract. The fact that alternative technologies depreciate differently can affect a 
manager’s investment decision, precisely due to the value of the abandonment option. This 
option approach to leasing is quite common in the literature, with Grenadier (1995) being 
another example, where he refers to residual value insurance (a mechanism by which the 
lessor would agree on the realisation of a fixed residual value at the termination of the 
contract, in case the actual market value falls below this threshold) as an equivalent to a put 
option. 
Furthermore, papers such as Giaccotto, Goldberg & Hedge (2007) and Miller (1995) 
have adopted the real options approach to value auto lease contracts, with the first focusing 
on penalties that significantly reduce the value of the lease cancellation option and the latter 
showing that the value of the abandonment option has to be taken into account in the lease 
vs. buy decision, otherwise there will be an unwanted bias towards the “buy” side. 
Some of the most cited literature focuses on leasing on the perspective of the lessee, 
analysing leasing as a source of financing and comparing it to alternatives such as 
traditional bank loans. This is the case of Eisfeldt & Rampini (2009), who develop a model 
in which companies differ in the amount of available internal financing. They conclude that 
due to the separation of ownership and control, financially constrained firms will tend to 
have a higher percentage of leased assets, while other firms will opt for secured lending. 
Earlier in time, Johnson & Lewellen (1972) have pointed out the importance of the 
discount rate in the analysis of lease financing. They argue that operational revenue and 




predictability of lease payments means that these should be discounted at the firm’s cost of 
debt. By comparing the financing alternatives, they determine that the difference between 
net salvage value and additional operating cost of owning, together with the difference 
between purchase price less depreciation tax savings and burden of lease payments are the 
most relevant variables in the financing decision. Finally, the paper points out that since a 
lease can be cheaper than a purchase, a previously rejected investment might turn out to be 
profitable if the lease terms are sufficiently attractive. 
A related intense discussion in the literature is the extent to which leases use up a 
company’s debt capacity. Albeit being a financing instrument, the characteristics of a 
leasing contract are significantly different from traditional financing sources in terms of the 
risk borne. Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson (2000) present leasing and debt as partial 
substitutes. The choice between them is determined by firm characteristics, of which the 
authors emphasise CEO share ownership (increases leases, to reduce impact on key 
financial ratios) and asset type (retail firms tend to lease more, given the generic nature of 
their fixed assets). They point out that despite being off-balance sheet items, leases do 
consume some debt capacity of the firm. Ang & Peterson (1984) argue differently, 
concluding that debt and leasing are complements. The study is performed following the 
implementation of accounting standards on leases, pointing out that many firms had to 
convert several operating leases into finance leases in light of these new regulations. They 
hypothesise that the positive relationship between leases and debt can be due to market 
inefficiency, tax reasons or qualitative differences. 
The accounting treatment of leases is also discussed by Dhaliwal, Lee & Neamtiu 
(2011), who point out the increased scrutiny of investors regarding the differences between 
operating and finance leases, debating the influence of lease classification on a firm’s cost 
of equity. Myers, Dill & Bautista (1976) focus on finance leases, understanding why firms 
lease. They compare this with regular financing to conclude that a leasing contract can only 
be valuable for both lessor and lessee (positive Net Present Value) if they face different 
income tax, cost of capital or tax shields, otherwise it would be a zero-sum game that 
would only benefit one or none of the parties involved. Franks & Hodges (1978) build on 
this paper to point out that if the tax rate faced by a company is not stable throughout the 
lease period, the payment scheme should be manipulated to optimise the tax benefits of 
such leases. They achieve this by constructing equivalence between leases and a purchase 





This idea of equivalence between leases and other financing alternatives is also part of 
the work of Miller & Upton (1976), starting off with an irrelevance proposition (if all 
agents were subject to the same tax policy). Given that the residual value is contracted 
ex-ante, the incentive of the lessee is to minimise the sum of production and maintenance 
costs, regardless of the asset’s final condition. This means that the longer the contract 
duration, the more the risk transfers from the lessor to the lessee, since the latter will have 
more time to suffer from the under-maintenance of the asset. The paper also refers to 
operation uncertainty, adapting the CAPM to incorporate a risk adjustment based on the 
uncertainty regarding the actual depreciation of the asset. 
Erickson (1993) adds further insights to the motivations behind the leasing decision. 
Cost, financing choice and asset characteristics are the determinants presented. Despite the 
possibility that debt and leases are complements, this buy/lease choice has to be done for 
each individual asset. As a function of the leases/long-term debt ratio, firms for which 
more information is available (using market value as a proxy) tend to lease less, as well as 
firms in financial distress (low Altman’s Z-Score) and firms with more debt. Conclusions 
are similar for regressions as a function of the leased assets/owned assets ratio, except for 
higher significance of non-debt tax shields and the reversed sign on the Altman’s Z. 
Industries are controlled for, with transportation and real estate being two of the most 
significant sectors. 
Grenadier (1996) determines the fair price of a leasing contract, introducing the lessee’s 
default risk into a pricing model, while discussing the different factors that impact on the 
value of the contract at the eyes of the lessor, depending on the lessee’s performance. This 
is complemented by Schmit (2004), who imports the concepts of Value at Risk and Loss 
Given Default into leasing contracts, including separate analysis for different asset types, 
such as automotive, other equipment, medical, and computers. 
Risk is also a central topic for Rode, Fischbeck & Dean (2002) who identify the pre-
determination of the residual value as a major source of risk, particularly when companies 
raise their residual values to improve competitiveness. The uncertainty arises from the fact 
that most valuations rely on managers’ experience rather than on hard data. Therefore, one 
should try to understand how much information is lacking and determine the magnitude 
and probability of deviations. The authors build a model to compute a probabilistic 





Smith & Wakeman (1985) discuss the types of assets that are more likely to be leased. 
They present leases as an advantage for managers evaluated through ROIC, since leases are 
not part of the denominator of this indicator. Leases will tend to happen in assets less 
sensitive to use and maintenance decisions. On the other hand, assets where administrative 
and contracting costs are high, such as firm-specific assets, tend to be bought. 
At a more macro level, Haiss & Kichler (2009) explored the usage of leasing as a 
growth instrument. They find a positive relationship between leasing and other forms of 
credit, and refute other research by concluding that countries with better governance use 
more leasing, so this form of financing is not a workaround for complex or immature legal 
systems in terms of creditors’ protection. Most companies provide either mixed assets or 
focus on auto leasing, and tend to be independent companies or owned by banks. 
II.1: THE CASE OF CAR LEASES 
Cars are one of the most common assets in leasing contracts, as shown in Leaseurope 
(2012), where automotive assets accounted for 60% of the new finance leases. Therefore, 
most of the research has been conducted in this specific asset type. This has been one of 
the reasons for choosing the automotive market as the data source for this thesis. The 
current subsection analyses previous literature regarding auto leases. 
Hendel & Lizzeri (2002) study car leasing to discuss whether leasing versus buying is a 
pure financing decision or if it is impacted by utilisation patterns. They state that since 
leased products are perceived as having higher quality, manufacturers can manipulate the 
second-hand market and reduce competition towards the new car market. Building on this 
study, Gilligan (2004) describes the relevance of information asymmetry in determining 
prices and trading volume. While in perfect markets an asset’s price is directly related with 
its deterioration, under asymmetric information price declines are higher and trade volume 
is lower, due to the presence of adverse selection. This paper also presents residual value as 
a function of the depreciation rate along with industry-specific and economy-wide factors, 
where depreciation depends on value, qualitative uncertainty and leasing frequency. 
Schmit (2005) studies the evolution of recovery rates throughout the length of the 
contract. The paper shows that lessors can take advantage of recovery rates above 100%, 
since as the contract approaches its end date the asset value might be greater than the 
amount due by the lessee. Therefore, recovery rates tend to increase as the contract 




arises as a combination of default frequency and loss severity, and that default probability 
can be subdivided into firm-specific diversifiable risk and a systematic component. 
Pirotte, Schmit & Vaessen (2004) come to the same conclusions as the previous paper, 
adding two extra innovations: (i) loss given default computation includes a resale 
opportunity cost component, due to the delay between repossession and actual sale and 
(ii) recovery rates are dependent on the economic state of the second-hand market, 
although the net gain remains positive when amounts due are close to the residual value. 
This last conclusion means that lessors will tend to prefer when the purchase option is not 
exercised by the lessee. Using this same sample, Pirotte & Vaessen (2008) explore loss 
given default, concluding that more than 25% of the defaulted contracts resulted in a 
negative LGD (positive net gain). This is related to the fact that average collateral of cars is 
convex and the amortisation scheme is linear, which puts time as a significant variable for 
variations of LGD. It also hypothesises that as economic downturn usually means higher 
default rates together with an expansion of the second-hand car market, it allows lessors to 
keep high recovery rates. 
The motivation for this thesis is close to that of Huisman (2008), who explores the 
concept of residual value in car leasing contracts and its impact on the lessor’s profits. He 
finds out that car leasing companies use publicly available tables to compute residual values 
for their contracts. Any alternative valuation method can be seen as an opportunity to 
increase a company’s competitiveness. The author uses explanatory variables such as car 
type, fuel consumption, mileage, among others, to come up with an alternative residual 
value computation. 
This thesis extends the current literature by specifically addressing residual value within 
Portuguese leasing companies, focusing on the valuation of the purchase option available 





III:  CONCEPT DEFINITION 
This section provides intuition on the way leasing contracts work, clarifying the 
concepts that will be used throughout this thesis. 
III.1:  LEASING VS. ALD VS. RENTING1 
Since this thesis will focus on auto leases, it is relevant to distinguish between leasing 
and other similar financing options available to those wanting to purchase or use a car. 
Therefore, apart from leasing, I briefly describe two alternatives designed exclusively for 
vehicles, namely the ALD (Aluguer de Longa Duração – Long-term rental) and Renting. 
ALD is a contract in which the user makes periodical payments, sometimes preceded 
by an upfront payment. The user is then obliged to purchase the vehicle at the end of the 
contract. Nevertheless, contract terms can usually be changed or transferred to another 
user throughout the contract. 
Renting is similar to ALD, except for the fact that it includes vehicle maintenance and 
does not include the obligation to purchase. 
It has been argued that the existence of these alternative forms of acquiring a vehicle 
have been a workaround for legal requirements of firms providing leases, topic that is out 
of scope of this thesis. 
After these necessary distinctions, this thesis will resume focus on aspects related to 
leasing contracts. 
III.2:  LEASING 
A leasing contract is a financing agreement in which the user (lessee) pays a rent to the 
owner (lessor) in exchange for the economic benefits of a given asset. In terms of rent 
computation, lease contracts usually work like constant rent loan payments2. Each 
(constant) payment at time t is composed of an amortisation component and an interest 
component, such that: 
 ̅        
Equation 1: Rent components 
                                                 
1 ALD/Leasing/Renting, at http://www.flexivisao.pt/pt/produtos.asp?id=1525&mid=228&mm=256 




Similarly to traditional financing sources, the amortisation component reimburses the 
lessor in the amount of principal owed while the interest component compensates the 
lender for the risk borne. 
For a given interest rate i and a T-period lease contract on an asset worth V and with a 
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Equation 2: Computation of rent components 
This formula implies that the full amount of the loan is reimbursed after all periods, 
such that: 
∑         
 
   
 
Equation 3: Condition on rent computation 
Putting these equations together, it is shown that each successive payment has a lower 
interest component and higher amortisation component than the previous one. Figure 1 
presents an adaptation of Figure 1 in Pirotte, Schmit & Vaessen (2004), showing the 
relationship between principal and interest components of rent payments throughout the 
contract length. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between interest and principal components of lease rents 
 
 
                                                 





Since it plays a crucial role in this thesis, further detail will be put into the analysis of 
the residual value, also known as salvage value. It can be defined as the book value of the 
lease debt at the end of the contract, and simultaneously the price at which the lessee can 
transfer to him the ownership of the asset at the end date of the leasing contract. If the 
option is not exercised, this value is written off against the return of the asset to the lessor. 
Therefore, the residual value is an important variable in the pricing of such contracts. To 
illustrate this, Table 1 shows rent computations for a contract with the following 
characteristics: 
 Acquisition value at t=0: €20,000 
 Contract length: 5 years 
 Monthly payments 
 10% annual interest rate 
 Residual value: €0; €1,000; €2,000 
Residual Value Interest Total Rent Rent+RV 
0.00 5,242.70 25,242.70 25,242.70 
1,000.00 5,079.93 24,459.01 25,079.93 
2,000.00 4,917.17 23,675.32 24,917.17 
Table 1: Interest and rent amounts for different values of Residual Value 
In this example, it is observable that a 5 percentage points increase in the residual value 
leads to a reduction in interest received of 0.8% of the asset value. In case the purchase 
option is not exercised, increasing the residual value by 5 percentage points reduces the 
total amount received by the lessor by 3.9%. 
To find out the appropriate lease terms, Lee, Martin & Senchack (1982) suggest the 
usage of Equation 4: 
     [ (   )]    (   )        (  ) 
Equation 4: Equivalence between asset value and leases 
This means that the (after tax) lease payments – PV[L(1-t)] – have to be set so that they 
are equal to the asset purchase price – S0 – minus the present value of tax shield on debt 
reimbursement4, investment tax credit attributable to the asset purchase – ITC – and 
after-tax residual value – PV(ST). The authors state that both the lease payments and the tax 
                                                 
4 The PV(DTS) part of the equation is no longer relevant, since regulations issued after the date of the 
abovementioned paper have determined that in finance leases the asset ought to be registered by the lessee, 




shields can be seen as riskless, but the rate at which to compute the present value of the 
residual value is worth discussing. 
The salvage value can be written as the combination of a long call option and a short 
put option on the underlying asset of same maturity and strike, plus the present value of 
the strike, as in Equation 5 (corresponding to Equation 3 of Lee, Martin & Senchack 
(1982)): 
  (  )    [   (      )]    ( )    [   (      )] 
Equation 5: Salvage Value as a combination of options 
Since solving Equation 4 for PV[L(1-t)] yields a negative sign on PV(ST), a lessor 
engaging in a lease contract is, in terms of residual value, equivalent to holding a short call 
and a long put on the asset, with the same maturity as the lease and a strike price equal to 
the salvage value plus borrowing the present value of the exercise price. 
Whenever the residual value is misstated, if it is set too high, it will reduce the amount 
of amortised principal and, ceteris paribus, the amount of rent. Additionally, at the end of the 
contract, it will not be profitable for the lessee to use the purchase option, and the lessor 
ends up with an overvalued asset on its balance sheet. This will lead to a necessary 
provision and reduction in the company’s net profit. 
On the other hand, if the residual value is set too low the rent is significantly increased 
but, at the end of the contract, the lessee will have an option to purchase the asset at a price 
that is lower than its market value, producing an opportunity cost for the lessor. 
Nevertheless, it shall be noted that this loss has been (at least partially) offset by the higher 
rent charged. 
III.3:  ALTERNATIVES AT LEASE TERMINATION DATE 
After the contracted lease period has ended, the lessee must choose between two 
alternatives: (i) purchase the asset by paying the residual value or (ii) not exercise the 
purchase option and return the asset. 
The companies contacted during this thesis’s research phase have agreed that their 
objective is to avoid the bothersome case of having the asset returned to them. Being 
financial companies, the presence of the used assets on their balance sheet has a negative 
influence on their performance ratios. Therefore, they use two main mechanisms to reduce 




other third-party the sale of the asset in case the lessee does not exercise the purchase 
option and (ii) set the residual value of the contracts safely below the expected market 
value at maturity, encouraging the lessee to exercise the purchase option. 
The consequence of the strategies outlined above, particularly (ii), is that the lessees 
exercise the purchase option on nearly 100% of the cases. The value of this option is an 
amount that the lessors are willing to forego to ensure that the asset is not returned and 
that the debt value is under control by being significantly below the value of the underlying 
asset. Hence, one of the objectives of this paper is to determine how much money is being 
left on the table by the lessors to ensure that (ii) is met. 
III.4:  ACCOUNTING FOR THE RESIDUAL VALUE 
This section discusses the accounting impact of the residual value of leasing contracts. 
As a starting point, a distinction ought to be made between operating leases and finance 
leases. The former were created as a way to suppress needs of expensive assets with long 
economic lives for short periods of time, while the latter ensures that the lessor has support 
in terms of collateral for its financing. 
In an accounting perspective, the difference is based on the distribution of risk between 
the lessor and the lessee, such that an agreement in which most risk is borne by the lessee is 
considered a finance lease, while it is an operating lease if most risk is borne by the lessor. 
Indications of the classification of leases as finance or operating are detailed in IAS 17.10 
and IAS 17.11. This analysis is based on the substance of the agreement rather than on its 
form, such that a lease can have different classifications on the lessor’s and lessee’s side 
(IAS 17.9). 
In a finance lease, the asset is registered by the lessee, together with a liability 
corresponding to the lease payments. In this case, the residual value should be added to the 
amount due (as a liability to the lessee and as an asset to the lessor) if it is sufficiently lower 
than the fair value to make the exercise of the purchase option very likely (IAS 17.4). That 
being the case, the lease will most likely be classified as a finance lease (IAS 17.10b). 
In the case of an operating lease, the residual value is not explicitly present in either 




income and expense (to the lessor and the lessee, respectively) in the period to which each 
payment refers to5. 
A relevant distinction to be made at this point is between amortisation and 
depreciation. The former refers to the reimbursement by the lessee of the amounts due to 
the lessor, while the latter corresponds to the reduction in the carrying amount of the asset 
as a consequence of its usage and deterioration. The study carried out in Huisman (2008) 
shows that depreciation tends not to be linear, but greater in the first quarters of asset 
usage. On the contrary, Figure 1 explains that (in constant rent contracts) amortisation is 
lower in the first years and progressively increases. This exemplifies that depreciation and 
amortisation represent two different aspects of the asset and should as such be treated 
separately. 
  
                                                 
5 For instance, if the payments have to be done one month in advance, they will come up as a cash-flow and 
as a differed cost/income when they occur but will be included in the income statement only in the month 




IV:  LEASING IN PORTUGAL 
Since the previous chapters have dealt with leasing in an international context, this 
section will introduce the characteristics of the leasing market and its regulation in Portugal. 
IV.1: MARKET DESCRIPTION 
Financial leases have an important role in financing the Portuguese economy. Total 
financial leases amounted to 6.7 billion Euros in 20076, corresponding to between 2% and 
4% of the country’s GDP in the last 15 years. Despite the consistent growth between 2003 
and 2007, the country’s economic context led to a subsequent reduction on the amount of 
leasing, with the amount of total production in 2012 being less than half of that of 2003 
and less than a quarter of the 2007 figure. 
In terms of asset types, it has remained relatively constant throughout the 2003-2012 
period. One third of the value of new lease contracts is related to real estate (industrial 
buildings, shops and supermarkets, hotels, among other), another third related to vehicles 
(cars and trucks) and the remaining third related to other assets (mainly industrial 
equipment). 
This evolution is depicted in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of leasing production in Portugal by asset type 
IV.2: REGULATION 
Financial leasing activities in Portugal can only be performed by banks, finance lease 
companies and credit-authorised financial institutions (IFIC – Instituições Financeiras de 
                                                 






















Crédito). The resulting contracts are subject to several regulations, namely those 
determined by Decree-Law 149/95 and its successive changes. 
I call particular attention to Banco de Portugal’s Notice of 28th June 1983, which 
further regulates financial lease contracts. It stipulates that rents can be paid before or after 
the period to which they respect, and should be either constant or variable. The formulae 
to be used are, respectively7: 
 ̅  
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  (   )  
 
 
Equation 6: Rent computation for constant rent leases 
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Equation 7: Rent computation for constant amortisation leases 
The first formula presented is equivalent to the first one in Equation 2. The second one 
provides an alternative method, where the amortisation is constant, leading to variable 
interest charges and consequent variable (decreasing) rent. This second approach only 
seldom appears in leases contracted in Portugal. 
Regarding the classification of leases, despite IAS 17.9 referred above, Order 
no. 16368/2013 determines that the classification of the lease (financial or operational) has 
to be explicitly written in the leasing contract. 
Portuguese legislation used to impose restrictions on the residual value. Decree-Law 
149/95 determined that this value should be between 2% and 25% of the acquisition cost. 
The above-mentioned Notice narrowed this interval to between 2% and 6%. Although this 
determination was revoked in 2001 (Decree-Law 285/2001), residual values in Portugal are 
usually low in comparison with the value of the second-hand asset, as will be shown further 
on. 
  
                                                 




V:  HYPOTHESIS , DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
Given the role of the residual value in leasing contracts, I hypothesise that in order to 
achieve abnormally high exercise percentages the lessors are transferring value to the 
lessees. They set very low salvage values to encourage the lessee to exercise the purchase 
option. 
In order to analyse the hypothesis, the valuation technique known as real options will 
be used. This is explained by Lee, Martin & Senchack (1982), who argue that calls transfer 
the costs of monitoring the condition of the asset from the lessor to the lessee, which 
generally leads to cost advantages. 
To ensure comparability and increase data availability, I focus this thesis on the Renault 
Clio, the most sold car model in Portugal8, computing the value of the real option at the 
inception of the lease. 
V.1: REAL OPTIONS 
Real options are a valuation method for projects that are in essence equivalent to the 
financial instrument “options”. In the words of Copeland & Antikarov (2001), p. 5: 
A real option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action (e.g., deferring, expanding, 
contracting or abandoning) at a predetermined cost called the exercise price, for a predetermined period of 
time – the life of the option. 
In the case of the leasing purchase option, it can be compared to a European Call, 
corresponding to the value of the right to acquire the asset at the end of the lease contract 
for a predetermined price. If, at that time, the market value of the asset is lower than its 
residual value, the lessee will opt not to exercise the option and obtain a payoff of zero. On 
the other hand, if the asset is worth more than the strike price, the option will be exercised 
and the lessor will have the obligation to sell the asset for its residual value, instead of for 
the (higher) fair value. Therefore, the asset owner has a short position on this option. 
While financial options have as underlying a written or traded security, real options 
have a tangible asset as the underlying. Consequently, the analysis of the asset price and its 
volatility is more complex in the case of real options in comparison with financial ones. 
 
                                                 





In order to compute the fair value of an option, the following parameters are needed: 
 Value of the underlying asset; 
 Exercise price; 
 Risk-free rate; 
 Time to Maturity; 
 Volatility of underlying asset value. 
In the case of leasing, the underlying asset is the leased object at maturity. I use the data 
made available by Usados AutoHoje9 and StandVirtual10 to gather the information about all 
second-hand Renault Clio up to ten years old available online between 29th November 2013 
and 2nd December 2013 and use it as the options’ ST. For the asset price at the beginning of 
the contract (S0), I use the “reference price” (detailed further on in the Volatility Estimation 
section) as the expected value of the asset at maturity. 
The exercise price is the amount by which the lessee has the option to acquire the 
leased asset at the end of the contract. In the context of this analysis, it corresponds to the 
asset’s residual value. This data was obtained through contacts held with Caixa Leasing e 
Factoring and Santander Totta. 
As per the risk-free rate, the 6-month EURIBOR rate will be used, as this is the 
industry standard in leasing contracts11. Based on this rate, financial institutions add their 
own spread to adjust for the lessee’s risk and come up with the interest rate implicit in the 
lease contract. 
Time to maturity is the time difference between the moment at which the option is 
valued and the lease termination date. 
VOLATILITY ESTIMATION 
Volatility of the underlying asset corresponds to the price fluctuation that the 
underlying asset is subject to. At this point, two sources of uncertainty affecting the value 
of the options can be identified: (i) the market value of the asset at maturity and (ii) the 
condition of the asset at maturity date. The difference between these is that whereas (i) 
affects all assets of the same category, (ii) refers only to the asset underlying a specific 
contract. Whenever the leased asset is unique or its market value cannot be determined due 
to lack of available information, only (ii) is relevant for the analysis. 








To estimate the volatility, I adopt the approach of Huisman (2008). By collecting 
quotes of used cars from AutoHoje magazine12, I obtain reference prices for Clios between 
one and ten years old. For each used car, I compute the natural logarithm of the ratio 
between the selling price and the reference price. The standard deviation to be used in 
option pricing corresponds to the standard deviation of the above-mentioned logarithms 
for each year-fuel combination. 
V.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The data collection presented above led to 389 different used Renault Clio, 240 of 
which carrying Diesel engines and the remaining being Petrol engines. This is a relevant 
distinction, since sample Diesel cars produced in a given year can cost up to 44% more 
than the Petrol cars of the same year. 
Detailed description of the sample is provided in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
V.3:  VALUE OF THE PURCHASE OPTION 
After this, I try to estimate the cost to the lessor of defining low residual values. Using 
the data described above, I apply standard Black-Scholes formula to value the purchase 
options. However, to be able to purchase the asset below market value, the lessee has to 
comply with the contractual obligations, namely paying the amortisation and the 
corresponding interest. To account for this, I compare simulations of two different 
contracts: one where the residual value equals the figures commonly used by financial 
institutions and one where the residual value is equivalent to the expected market price of 
that car. By subtracting the cash-flow difference between these two scenarios to the call 
value, I arrive at the estimated cost to the lessor of the purchase option. 
In these simulations, there is an additional required variable, which is the interest rate. I 
use a 5.5% annual nominal interest rate as a starting point, since this is coherent with the 
practice of most financial institutions, according to data provided in their official pricing 
documents13. The impact of this variable will be tested in the VI.2: Sensitivity Analysis. 
                                                 
12 No. 1255, 28th November 2013-4th December 2013, page 81 
13http://www.bes.pt/sitebes/cms.aspx?plg=3a1e6ebc-648a-48d7-966b-3d0cfaa6a434 (page 5), 
http://www.clf.pt/SiteCollectionDocuments/CLF_Precario.pdf (page 29), 
http://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/pt/Articles/Documents/precario2/021_018.pdf (page 3) and 




As residual values can be negotiated, I set up the purchase option valuation considering 
an upper and a lower bound on the contracted residual values. 
V.4: ASSUMPTIONS 
The above data description carries a critical assumption concerning the equivalence 
between different cars across time. As technology evolves, newer cars tend to have better 
equipment without a price increase. To overcome this, I assume that cars with equivalent 
engines have the same price when new, regardless of their year of production. 
Additionally, it is necessary to assume that previously leased cars and regular second-
hand cars are equally valuable. This contradicts the conclusions of for example Hendel & 
Lizzeri (2002), but it is a necessary assumption to come up with prices for second-hand 
cars and will be nevertheless used as a proxy. 
Finally, there are assumptions implicit in the Black-Scholes formula that will be used to 
value the options. Firstly, the formula assumes that the logarithm of the price ratio is 
normally distributed. The data samples are too short to provide fully reliable results, but 
Jarque-Bera normality tests indicate that normality is not rejected in the majority of the 
cases.  Whenever normality is rejected, returns tend to be leptokurtic (current variance is 
overestimated, leading to overvalued calls) and there are mixed results in terms of 
skewness. The other significant assumption is that volatility is constant throughout the life 





VI:  RESULTS  
After applying the methodology described in the previous section, I am able to arrive at 
the cost to the lessor of each leasing contract, depending on its maturity. As a function of 
maturity, considering the minimum and maximum contractual residual values defined, this 
cost is as depicted in Figure 314. 
  
Figure 3: Cost to lessor of the leasing purchase option, with RV intervals for diesel and petrol 
vehicles 
Regarding the cost to lessor for different maturities, it is observable that it increases in 
the first five years and then has a slight decrease in the following maturities. Due to a lower 
price, the cost to lessors for Petrol cars is usually lower than for Diesel cars. The former 
fluctuates between €365 and €1,115, while the latter fit in the range between €415 and 
€1,328. 
The amplitude between the cost for maximum and minimum residual values can be 
explained by two factors: (i) the size of the range of admissible residual values is not 
constant throughout maturities, tending to decrease as length increases; (ii) the value of 
used cars (reference price) decreases in a quasi-linear fashion, whereas the contracted 
residual values have a more convex shape. This originates a smaller cost to lessor range on 
the extremes of the length and larger on the middle lengths. 
To frame these figures in terms of magnitude, Figure 4 presents the same data as Figure 
3 but as a percentage of the loan amount: 
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Figure 4: Cost to lessor of the leasing purchase option, as a percentage of the amount of the loan 
As expected, the pattern is equivalent in the last two figures, but when considering the 
cost as a percentage, the difference between Diesel and Petrol engines still exists but is 
much less significant. 
The cost to lessor can be decomposed into the cost of the purchase option (call) and 
the cash-flow benefit of contracting a higher residual value. 
  
Figure 5: Decomposition of the cost to lessor between call value and cash-flow gains 
Figure 5 shows that the increase in cost to lessor between years 1 and 5 happens 
because the call value slightly increases while the residual value gain (cash-flow difference 
of contracting a low residual value) decreases. In the subsequent years, both the call value 
and the RV gain decrease, with the latter decreasing more than the other and leading to a 
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When valuing options, measures known as the “Greeks” can be used to assess the 
sensitivity of the options to their composing factors. However, since the calls under 
analysis are deeply in-the-money, i.e., the actual asset price is way above the call’s strike 
price, all Greeks are very close to their upper bound values, such that: 
Delta Gamma Theta 
1 0          
Table 2: Greeks for the options under analysis 
This means that small changes in asset price lead to directly proportional changes in call 
value (Delta), that no correction is needed to Delta when asset price changes are greater 
(Gamma) and that the passage of time consistently decreases the value of the option in its 
maximum amount (Theta).  
VI.2: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
To account for the limitations of the sample used, sensitivity analyses are performed to 
check the consequences of deviations between the sampled values and the actual values. 
To improve the readability of the data, the analyses below include two graphs each, one 
for Diesel engines and one for Petrol engines. Instead of using upper and lower residual 
value bounds, I use an average of both so that the graphs include only three lines: base 
case, positive scenario and negative scenario. 
Results are condensed in Table 7. 
CONTRACT INTEREST RATE 
The interest rate of a leasing contract is dependent on two main variables: (i) the base 
rate, which depends on the macroeconomic factors that influence the EURIBOR rate and 
(ii) the client risk, which determines the spread applied to a given contract. In the current 
financial environment, the interbank rates are particularly low, so the major source of 
uncertainty is the client risk. Starting from the base case of a 5.5% interest rate, I recalculate 





Figure 6: Sensitivity of the cost to lessor relative to the contract interest rate 
In this case, increasing the interest rate increases the cost to the lessor, while a lower 
interest rate reduces this cost. This happens since the call analysis is done in a risk-free 
environment, leading to the impact only happening on the cash-flow difference between 
the contracts. When the contract interest rate is higher, the cash-flow gains of low residual 
values are reduced and the cost to the lessor increases. The effects are greater as the 
maturity of the contracts increases. 
REFERENCE PRICE 
Due to the lack of information regarding the used car market, it is possible that the 
estimations of the value of the used cars each year are not fully accurate. Therefore, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed, increasing and decreasing the reference price by 10% to 
check the impact on the cost to lessor. 
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Increasing (decreasing) the reference price for used cars increases (decreases) the value 
of the call more than it increases (decreases) the cash-flow gains of low residual values, 
resulting in an increase (decrease) of the cost to lessor. These impacts increase up to five 
years maturity, after which they slightly decrease. 
NEW PRICE 
Finally, I test the sensitivity of the cost to lessor relative to the price of new cars. 
Assuming that the used cars keep their value unchanged but the new ones become more 
(less) expensive, an inverse reaction is observed in the cost to lessor, meaning that a 10% 
increase (decrease) in the price of new cars leads to a decrease (increase) in the cost to 
lessor, although these differences are rather small. 
  
Figure 8: Sensitivity of the cost to lessor relative to the new car price 
Changing the price of the car barely affects the cost to lessor, since the change in the 
call value is almost perfectly offset by the cash-flow gains. 
VI.3: ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTS 
At this point, I have computed the value of the purchase option considering the lessors’ 
current policy of setting low residual values. 
An alternative would be setting the residual value equal to the expected market value of 
the asset at maturity. This means that the purchase option is now represented by a nearly 
at-the-money call. However, the cost of disposing the returned asset is now much more 
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Based on the current sample, I compute the percentage of used cars put for sale below 
the reference price. This will be the proportion of cars that would be returned, and using 
an expected value logic, I add P(return)*disposal cost to the call value to come up with the 
cost to lessor of this scenario. Using the reference prices from AutoHoje, the percentage of 
returns is still fairly low, with an average of 30%, 7 cases (out of 20) with no returns and 5 
cases above 50% of returns. As seen in Figure 9, returns of Diesel cars are particularly high 
in medium-term contracts (3-6 years), while on Petrol cars the pattern seems more random. 
 
Figure 9: Percentage of returned cars for the RV=E(MV) scenario 
 
With a contract of this type, when the option is not exercised, lessors have two 
alternatives at maturity: (i) sell the asset for its residual value to a third-party that will be 
responsible for its sale or (ii) sell the asset and bear the cost. Each of these is analysed 
below. 
THIRD-PARTY SALE 
The disposal cost is the expense related to preparing the car to be sold, and is reported 
to amount to €250. This cost has been ignored in the previous analysis since the probability 
of asset return was negligible. 
The analysis of this alternative leads to a cost to lessor between €230 and €2,620, which 
as a percentage of the loan amount is represented as follows15: 
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Figure 10: Cost to lessor as a percentage of loan amount for the 3rd party sale 
LOSS-BEARING SALE 
The lessor may also sell the car autonomously, in which case the unrealised residual 
value ought to be added to the call price. In this case, this cost to lessor fits between €200 
and €3,660, represented as a percentage of the loan amount in the following figure16: 
 
Figure 11: Cost to lessor as a percentage of loan amount for the loss-bearing sale 
VI.4: RESULTS’ COMPARISON 
Comparing the cost to lessor of the different strategies (upper and lower bound of 
residual value and the RV=E(MV) alternatives)17, the 3rd party sale is the best in 12 out of 
20 cases. Still, we should take into account that increasing the residual value will reduce the 
ability of the third-party to make a profit, so they might increase the fee charged to the 
lessor. 
                                                 
16 Detailed in Table 9 
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Nevertheless, two main factors significantly reduce the viability of the third-party sale: 
(i) the return percentages would make lessors act like car dealers more than financiers, 
which is not their strategic objective and (ii) a high residual value implies that the lessee will 
have an expensive final payment, and he or she might prefer to spread such payments 
throughout the length of the contract. Financial leasing is targeted at consumers that are 
almost certain that they want to keep their vehicle at maturity and there are other available 





VII:  CONCLUSION 
The residual value is a critical component of leasing contracts, impacting on the amount 
of amortisation and subsequently on the amount of interest. Associated with the residual 
value is the option to purchase the leased asset for that price. Since companies have 
reported nearly 100% of contracts with the option exercised, I studied the value of such 
option and whether it was being taken into account by lessors. 
The literature review highlights the relevance of the topic, showing that the lease vs. 
buy decision has been a matter of concern for companies and that the real options 
approach has been widely used to describe leasing contracts and assess their usefulness. 
Furthermore, it shows that accounting standards and their worldwide adoption has 
changed the way companies view financing through leasing. The distinction between 
finance and operational leases forced companies to abandon the use of leasing as an 
instrument to promote off-balance sheet items and eliminated the ability for lessors to 
benefit from asset depreciation.  
In Portugal, leasing has shown an increasing relevance in the economy, although 
negatively impacted by the recent crisis. Based on contacts with two financial institutions 
providing leasing, they argue that residual values have to be set safely below the expected 
market value of the asset at maturity, to avoid the risk of having the asset returned, 
incurring in transaction costs and damaging financial ratios due to the increased asset 
amount, while keeping the face value of debt below asset value. 
Following the investigation of the existing literature and the characteristics of finance 
leases in Portugal, I focus on the residual value and its role within leasing contracts. By 
setting low residual values, lessors are forced to forego some value at maturity. I use real 
options analysis and a comparison between current contracts and contracts where the 
residual value equals the expected market value to assess the implicit costs of current 
pricing policies. For the Renault Clio, one of the most common cars on Portuguese roads, 
the cost to lessors can be as low as €190 and as high as €2,200, corresponding to between 
1% and 12.2% of the financed amount. The higher the residual value the lower the cost to 
lessor, with this cost tending to be higher for Diesel engines compared to Petrol ones. 
Considering vehicles between one and ten years old, separated by fuel type, the cost to 




in the following table, both in its absolute amount and as a percentage of the financed 
amount: 
Age Fuel Low RV % High RV % 
1 Diesel 415.71 2.32% 190.93 1.06% 
 
Petrol 365.30 2.53% 362.60 2.51% 
2 Diesel 774.56 4.32% 512.46 2.85% 
 
Petrol 627.85 4.34% 416.86 2.88% 
3 Diesel 1296.98 7.23% 1103.21 6.15% 
 
Petrol 1024.73 7.09% 717.16 4.96% 
4 Diesel 1663.38 9.27% 1168.76 6.51% 
 
Petrol 1251.25 8.66% 852.59 5.90% 
5 Diesel 2189.07 12.20% 1474.56 8.21% 
 
Petrol 1688.23 11.68% 1115.19 7.72% 
6 Diesel 1916.47 10.68% 1261.15 7.03% 
 
Petrol 1391.66 9.63% 863.92 5.98% 
7 Diesel 1887.24 10.51% 1409.41 7.85% 
 
Petrol 1257.46 8.70% 872.45 6.04% 
8 Diesel 1785.05 9.94% 1558.74 8.68% 
 
Petrol 1250.60 8.65% 1060.33 7.34% 
9 Diesel 1583.52 8.82% 1327.93 7.40% 
 
Petrol 1131.31 7.83% 925.03 6.40% 
10 Diesel 1516.41 8.45% 1240.66 6.91% 
 
Petrol 1074.47 7.44% 849.87 5.88% 
Table 3: Cost to Lessor summary 
These conclusions confirm those in papers such as Huisman (2008) and Lee, Martin & 
Senchack (1982), who point out the worthiness and relevance of the purchase option 
within the context of leasing contracts. 
Furthermore, sensitivity analyses have shown that interest rate, reference price and new 
price have significant impact on the cost to the lessor, with a positive relationship in the 
first two and a negative relationship in the latter. 
An alternative strategy would be setting the residual value equal to the expected market 
value of the asset at maturity. Setting up these contracts and selling the returned assets to a 
third-party is comparatively cheaper in most cases, but differs in substance from the 






VII.1:  LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Given the complexity of the real world, several aspects have to be assumed or left 
behind to allow the conclusions to be focused on a given variable. 
The analysis carried out here can therefore be expanded. Being focused on a single car 
model, for cars available for sale within a narrow period of time, both sample ranges can be 
expanded. On the one hand, using multiple car models would show whether the 
conclusions obtained for the Renault Clio are valid for other cars and if the cost to the 
lessor is equivalent. On the other hand, performing the valuations for cars available for sale 
in other moments would reduce the effect of factors specific to a given period, where the 
cars could be particularly under- or overvalued. 
Another significant assumption is the use of current used car prices and current new 
car prices. For the conclusions to be valid, it is assumed that in X years a car bought today 
will have the same price as the price that a car bought X years ago has today. The same is 
valid for new cars, where cars with equivalent engines have the same price when new, 
regardless of their year of production. 
Other limitations have been discussed throughout the document, namely the lack of 
price discrimination between leased and acquired cars and the assumptions of the Black-
Scholes valuation model. 
VII.2:  FINAL REMARK 
To conclude, I hope that this thesis has contributed to raise awareness towards the 
relevance of the residual value in the context of leasing contracts, contributing to the 
correct understanding of the consequences of setting low residual values and promoting 





  Average Price StDev of Price Sample Size Reference Price 
2003 
   
 
Diesel 4281.12 812.54 17 3882.50 
Petrol 3533.75 576.33 16 2767.50 
2004 
   
 
Diesel 5248.18 1077.37 11 4356.67 
Petrol 3636.58 704.13 12 3128.00 
2005 
   
 
Diesel 5460.00 1375.75 13 5329.17 
Petrol 5125.00 530.33 2 3751.43 
2006 
   
 
Diesel 6633.77 978.60 13 6226.00 
Petrol 5604.29 350.66 7 4172.00 
2007 
   
 
Diesel 7606.92 925.40 13 7138.57 
Petrol 6512.50 405.94 12 5197.14 
2008 
   
 
Diesel 8397.08 1469.10 40 9615.00 
Petrol 7502.74 1796.73 27 7426.67 
2009 
   
 
Diesel 9499.20 1252.56 25 10250.00 
Petrol 8775.00 757.74 4 7800.00 
2010 
   
 
Diesel 10833.15 1659.57 52 11136.00 
Petrol 8535.42 969.13 24 8865.00 
2011 
   
 
Diesel 12024.13 730.98 24 10885.71 
Petrol 9318.29 384.02 35 8805.00 
2012 
   
 
Diesel 13415.63 815.32 32 12035.00 
Petrol 9832.90 2176.27 10 10260.00 
2013 (New) 
   
 
Diesel - - 
 
17950.00 
Petrol - - 
 
14450.00 
Grand Total 8575.80 2950.59 389  






Cost to Lessor – Minimum RV 
 
Type DeltaT S0 RV% Strike Vol Call RV Gain Cost to Lessor Cost/Loan Strike/S0 RV Gain/Call 
2012Diesel 1 11995.30 25% 4487.50 0.059 7,522.62 € 7,106.91 € 415.71 € 2.32% 37.41% 94.47% 
2011Diesel 2 10814.01 20% 3590.00 0.061 7,247.69 € 6,473.14 € 774.56 € 4.32% 33.20% 89.31% 
2010Diesel 3 11026.15 15% 2692.50 0.324 8,365.69 € 7,068.71 € 1,296.98 € 7.23% 24.42% 84.50% 
2009Diesel 4 10115.41 10% 1795.00 0.136 8,344.01 € 6,680.64 € 1,663.38 € 9.27% 17.75% 80.07% 
2008Diesel 5 9457.44 2% 359.00 0.189 9,104.33 € 6,915.26 € 2,189.07 € 12.20% 3.80% 75.96% 
2007Diesel 6 6998.43 1% 179.50 0.124 6,822.46 € 4,905.99 € 1,916.47 € 10.68% 2.56% 71.91% 
2006Diesel 7 6083.63 1% 179.50 0.155 5,908.25 € 4,021.01 € 1,887.24 € 10.51% 2.95% 68.06% 
2005Diesel 8 5190.13 1% 179.50 0.296 5,015.32 € 3,230.27 € 1,785.05 € 9.94% 3.46% 64.41% 
2004Diesel 9 4229.00 1% 179.50 0.218 4,054.77 € 2,471.25 € 1,583.52 € 8.82% 4.24% 60.95% 
2003Diesel 10 3756.30 1% 179.50 0.202 3,582.64 € 2,066.23 € 1,516.41 € 8.45% 4.78% 57.67% 
2012Petrol 1 10226.15 25% 3612.50 0.315 6,625.81 € 6,260.51 € 365.30 € 2.53% 35.33% 94.49% 
2011Petrol 2 8747.00 20% 2890.00 0.041 5,876.07 € 5,248.22 € 627.85 € 4.34% 33.04% 89.32% 
2010Petrol 3 8777.55 15% 2167.50 0.101 6,631.47 € 5,606.73 € 1,024.73 € 7.09% 24.69% 84.55% 
2009Petrol 4 7697.58 10% 1445.00 0.086 6,271.58 € 5,020.33 € 1,251.25 € 8.66% 18.77% 80.05% 
2008Petrol 5 7304.97 2% 289.00 0.189 7,020.71 € 5,332.48 € 1,688.23 € 11.68% 3.96% 75.95% 
2007Petrol 6 5095.11 1% 144.50 0.062 4,953.45 € 3,561.80 € 1,391.66 € 9.63% 2.84% 71.91% 
2006Petrol 7 4076.60 1% 144.50 0.065 3,935.41 € 2,677.96 € 1,257.46 € 8.70% 3.54% 68.05% 
2005Petrol 8 3653.55 1% 144.50 0.104 3,512.83 € 2,262.23 € 1,250.60 € 8.65% 3.96% 64.40% 
2004Petrol 9 3036.34 1% 144.50 0.200 2,896.08 € 1,764.78 € 1,131.31 € 7.83% 4.76% 60.94% 
2003Petrol 10 2677.54 1% 144.50 0.157 2,537.75 € 1,463.28 € 1,074.47 € 7.44% 5.40% 57.66% 





Cost to Lessor – Maximum RV 
Type DeltaT S0 RV% Strike Vol Call RV Gain Cost to Lessor Cost/Loan Strike/S0 RV Gain/Call 
2012Diesel 1 11995.30 50% 8975.00 0.059 3,049.95 € 2,859.02 € 190.93 € 1.06% 74.82% 93.74% 
2011Diesel 2 10814.01 35% 6282.50 0.061 4,572.96 € 4,060.50 € 512.46 € 2.85% 58.10% 88.79% 
2010Diesel 3 11026.15 30% 5385.00 0.324 5,888.11 € 4,784.90 € 1,103.21 € 6.15% 48.84% 81.26% 
2009Diesel 4 10115.41 25% 4487.50 0.136 5,687.53 € 4,518.77 € 1,168.76 € 6.51% 44.36% 79.45% 
2008Diesel 5 9457.44 20% 3590.00 0.189 5,934.11 € 4,459.54 € 1,474.56 € 8.21% 37.96% 75.15% 
2007Diesel 6 6998.43 15% 2692.50 0.124 4,359.11 € 3,097.97 € 1,261.15 € 7.03% 38.47% 71.07% 
2006Diesel 7 6083.63 10% 1795.00 0.155 4,330.18 € 2,920.77 € 1,409.41 € 7.85% 29.51% 67.45% 
2005Diesel 8 5190.13 5% 897.50 0.296 4,326.13 € 2,767.39 € 1,558.74 € 8.68% 17.29% 63.97% 
2004Diesel 9 4229.00 5% 897.50 0.218 3,361.01 € 2,033.09 € 1,327.93 € 7.40% 21.22% 60.49% 
2003Diesel 10 3756.30 5% 897.50 0.202 2,892.12 € 1,651.46 € 1,240.66 € 6.91% 23.89% 57.10% 
2012Petrol 1 10226.15 50% 7225.00 0.315 3,203.50 € 2,840.90 € 362.60 € 2.51% 70.65% 88.68% 
2011Petrol 2 8747.00 35% 5057.50 0.041 3,722.87 € 3,306.01 € 416.86 € 2.88% 57.82% 88.80% 
2010Petrol 3 8777.55 30% 4335.00 0.101 4,485.39 € 3,768.23 € 717.16 € 4.96% 49.39% 84.01% 
2009Petrol 4 7697.58 25% 3612.50 0.086 4,132.59 € 3,280.00 € 852.59 € 5.90% 46.93% 79.37% 
2008Petrol 5 7304.97 20% 2890.00 0.189 4,470.79 € 3,355.59 € 1,115.19 € 7.72% 39.56% 75.06% 
2007Petrol 6 5095.11 15% 2167.50 0.062 2,970.23 € 2,106.32 € 863.92 € 5.98% 42.54% 70.91% 
2006Petrol 7 4076.60 10% 1445.00 0.065 2,664.70 € 1,792.25 € 872.45 € 6.04% 35.45% 67.26% 
2005Petrol 8 3653.55 5% 722.50 0.104 2,949.93 € 1,889.60 € 1,060.33 € 7.34% 19.78% 64.06% 
2004Petrol 9 3036.34 5% 722.50 0.200 2,337.08 € 1,412.05 € 925.03 € 6.40% 23.80% 60.42% 
2003Petrol 10 2677.54 5% 722.50 0.157 1,979.25 € 1,129.38 € 849.87 € 5.88% 26.98% 57.06% 





Cost to Lessor – Sensitivity Analysis 
Type Base Case Interest Up Interest Down Reference Up Reference Down New Up New Down 
2012Diesel 303.32 377.13 228.31 367.37 239.33 269.64 337.04 
2011Diesel 643.51 798.37 483.75 755.91 531.11 595.46 691.56 
2010Diesel 1200.10 1459.57 928.40 1339.58 1072.88 1192.18 1220.08 
2009Diesel 1416.07 1740.53 1071.21 1615.20 1217.47 1359.03 1473.61 
2008Diesel 1831.82 2240.72 1390.67 2056.91 1608.53 1791.59 1873.78 
2007Diesel 1588.81 1931.55 1213.48 1785.06 1392.75 1551.61 1626.18 
2006Diesel 1648.32 1992.58 1265.65 1842.24 1454.57 1619.39 1677.41 
2005Diesel 1671.90 2009.35 1291.15 1855.10 1489.19 1656.35 1687.93 
2004Diesel 1455.72 1738.76 1131.57 1620.02 1291.74 1437.29 1474.46 
2003Diesel 1378.54 1636.21 1078.99 1536.50 1220.97 1358.80 1398.66 
2012Petrol 363.95 431.35 295.45 378.73 378.70 413.29 343.46 
2011Petrol 522.35 648.12 392.62 613.27 431.44 483.67 561.04 
2010Petrol 870.95 1076.16 656.06 1004.17 737.74 824.83 917.08 
2009Petrol 1051.92 1292.39 796.33 1203.62 900.22 1005.42 1098.43 
2008Petrol 1401.71 1714.03 1064.76 1575.05 1230.17 1370.22 1434.94 
2007Petrol 1127.79 1370.50 861.99 1270.72 984.85 1097.63 1157.94 
2006Petrol 1064.95 1286.64 818.53 1194.97 934.93 1041.42 1088.48 
2005Petrol 1155.46 1389.06 891.90 1285.28 1025.65 1141.19 1169.73 
2004Petrol 1028.17 1227.79 799.55 1146.14 910.44 1013.24 1043.33 
2003Petrol 962.17 1141.87 753.27 1075.10 849.39 945.60 978.88 





RV=PV(E(MV)) – 3rd party sale 
Type DeltaT S0 Strike Vol Call % Returns TransCost Cost to Lessor Cost/Loan 
2012Diesel 1 11995.30 12035.00 0.059 281.64 € 0% 0.00 € 281.64 € 1.57% 
2011Diesel 2 10814.01 10885.71 0.061 372.27 € 4% 10.42 € 382.68 € 2.13% 
2010Diesel 3 11026.15 11136.00 0.324 2,439.76 € 52% 129.81 € 2,569.57 € 14.32% 
2009Diesel 4 10115.41 10250.00 0.136 1,093.16 € 84% 210.00 € 1,303.16 € 7.26% 
2008Diesel 5 9457.44 9615.00 0.189 1,576.15 € 80% 200.00 € 1,776.15 € 9.89% 
2007Diesel 6 6998.43 7138.57 0.124 847.92 € 38% 96.15 € 944.08 € 5.26% 
2006Diesel 7 6083.63 6226.00 0.155 985.47 € 31% 76.92 € 1,062.40 € 5.92% 
2005Diesel 8 5190.13 5329.17 0.296 1,686.38 € 38% 96.15 € 1,782.53 € 9.93% 
2004Diesel 9 4229.00 4356.67 0.218 1,086.12 € 18% 45.45 € 1,131.57 € 6.30% 
2003Diesel 10 3756.30 3882.50 0.202 940.11 € 24% 58.82 € 998.94 € 5.57% 
2012Petrol 1 10226.15 10260.00 0.315 1,278.28 € 50% 125.00 € 1,403.28 € 9.71% 
2011Petrol 2 8747.00 8805.00 0.041 201.50 € 0% 0.00 € 201.50 € 1.39% 
2010Petrol 3 8777.55 8865.00 0.101 612.38 € 71% 177.08 € 789.46 € 5.46% 
2009Petrol 4 7697.58 7800.00 0.086 525.78 € 0% 0.00 € 525.78 € 3.64% 
2008Petrol 5 7304.97 7426.67 0.189 1,222.22 € 78% 194.44 € 1,416.66 € 9.80% 
2007Petrol 6 5095.11 5197.14 0.062 309.57 € 0% 0.00 € 309.57 € 2.14% 
2006Petrol 7 4076.60 4172.00 0.065 278.95 € 0% 0.00 € 278.95 € 1.93% 
2005Petrol 8 3653.55 3751.43 0.104 425.91 € 0% 0.00 € 425.91 € 2.95% 
2004Petrol 9 3036.34 3128.00 0.200 716.69 € 33% 83.33 € 800.02 € 5.54% 
2003Petrol 10 2677.54 2767.50 0.157 524.87 € 0% 0.00 € 524.87 € 3.63% 





RV=PV(E(MV)) – Loss-Bearing Sale 
Type DeltaT S0 Strike Vol Call % Returns Loss Cost to Lessor Cost/Loan 
2012Diesel 1 11995.30 12035.00 0.059 281.64 € 0% 0.00 € 281.64 € 1.57% 
2011Diesel 2 10814.01 10885.71 0.061 372.27 € 4% 635.71 € 1,007.98 € 5.62% 
2010Diesel 3 11026.15 11136.00 0.324 2,439.76 € 52% 1,220.30 € 3,660.06 € 20.39% 
2009Diesel 4 10115.41 10250.00 0.136 1,093.16 € 84% 1,108.10 € 2,201.25 € 12.26% 
2008Diesel 5 9457.44 9615.00 0.189 1,576.15 € 80% 1,685.81 € 3,261.96 € 18.17% 
2007Diesel 6 6998.43 7138.57 0.124 847.92 € 38% 488.57 € 1,336.49 € 7.45% 
2006Diesel 7 6083.63 6226.00 0.155 985.47 € 31% 763.50 € 1,748.97 € 9.74% 
2005Diesel 8 5190.13 5329.17 0.296 1,686.38 € 38% 1,181.17 € 2,867.55 € 15.98% 
2004Diesel 9 4229.00 4356.67 0.218 1,086.12 € 18% 781.67 € 1,867.79 € 10.41% 
2003Diesel 10 3756.30 3882.50 0.202 940.11 € 24% 682.50 € 1,622.61 € 9.04% 
2012Petrol 1 10226.15 10260.00 0.315 1,278.28 € 50% 1,532.20 € 2,810.48 € 19.45% 
2011Petrol 2 8747.00 8805.00 0.041 201.50 € 0% 0.00 € 201.50 € 1.39% 
2010Petrol 3 8777.55 8865.00 0.101 612.38 € 71% 754.41 € 1,366.79 € 9.46% 
2009Petrol 4 7697.58 7800.00 0.086 525.78 € 0% 0.00 € 525.78 € 3.64% 
2008Petrol 5 7304.97 7426.67 0.189 1,222.22 € 78% 624.57 € 1,846.79 € 12.78% 
2007Petrol 6 5095.11 5197.14 0.062 309.57 € 0% 0.00 € 309.57 € 2.14% 
2006Petrol 7 4076.60 4172.00 0.065 278.95 € 0% 0.00 € 278.95 € 1.93% 
2005Petrol 8 3653.55 3751.43 0.104 425.91 € 0% 0.00 € 425.91 € 2.95% 
2004Petrol 9 3036.34 3128.00 0.200 716.69 € 33% 318.25 € 1,034.94 € 7.16% 
2003Petrol 10 2677.54 2767.50 0.157 524.87 € 0% 0.00 € 524.87 € 3.63% 






3rd party Own Sale Min RV Max RV Cheapest Most Expensive 
2012Diesel 281.64 € 281.64 € 415.71 € 190.93 € Max RV Min RV 
2011Diesel 382.68 € 1,007.98 € 774.56 € 512.46 € 3rd party Own Sale 
2010Diesel 2,569.57 € 3,660.06 € 1,296.98 € 1,103.21 € Max RV Own Sale 
2009Diesel 1,303.16 € 2,201.25 € 1,663.38 € 1,168.76 € Max RV Own Sale 
2008Diesel 1,776.15 € 3,261.96 € 2,189.07 € 1,474.56 € Max RV Own Sale 
2007Diesel 944.08 € 1,336.49 € 1,916.47 € 1,261.15 € 3rd party Min RV 
2006Diesel 1,062.40 € 1,748.97 € 1,887.24 € 1,409.41 € 3rd party Min RV 
2005Diesel 1,782.53 € 2,867.55 € 1,785.05 € 1,558.74 € Max RV Own Sale 
2004Diesel 1,131.57 € 1,867.79 € 1,583.52 € 1,327.93 € 3rd party Own Sale 
2003Diesel 998.94 € 1,622.61 € 1,516.41 € 1,240.66 € 3rd party Own Sale 
2012Petrol 1,403.28 € 2,810.48 € 365.30 € 362.60 € Max RV Own Sale 
2011Petrol 201.50 € 201.50 € 627.85 € 416.86 € 3rd party Min RV 
2010Petrol 789.46 € 1,366.79 € 1,024.73 € 717.16 € Max RV Own Sale 
2009Petrol 525.78 € 525.78 € 1,251.25 € 852.59 € 3rd party Min RV 
2008Petrol 1,416.66 € 1,846.79 € 1,688.23 € 1,115.19 € Max RV Own Sale 
2007Petrol 309.57 € 309.57 € 1,391.66 € 863.92 € 3rd party Min RV 
2006Petrol 278.95 € 278.95 € 1,257.46 € 872.45 € 3rd party Min RV 
2005Petrol 425.91 € 425.91 € 1,250.60 € 1,060.33 € 3rd party Min RV 
2004Petrol 800.02 € 1,034.94 € 1,131.31 € 925.03 € 3rd party Min RV 
2003Petrol 524.87 € 524.87 € 1,074.47 € 849.87 € 3rd party Min RV 
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